MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JAMES O. BROWNING, District Judge.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the United States' Sealed Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Samuel Roll, filed February 15, 2011 (Doc. 101)("Motion"). The Court held an evidentiary hearing on May 13, 2011. The primary issues are: (i) whether Dr. Samuel Roll's report is reliable; (ii) whether Dr. Roll's proposed testimony is irrelevant and infringes on the jury's province to determine the facts and assess credibility; and (iii) whether, if the Court finds that Dr. Roll's testimony is admissible pursuant to rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, it should exclude the testimony on the grounds that the alleged unfair prejudice Plaintiff United States of America would suffer as a result of its admission substantially outweighs any probative value Defendant Kalvest Ganadonegro would gain by its introduction. The Court will grant in part and deny in part the United States' motion. The Court finds that at least some of Dr. Roll's testimony is reliable. It finds that Dr. Roll's testimony, insofar as it goes to the credibility of Ganadonegro's statements in an interview with law enforcement officers, is irrelevant. The Court will thus exclude Dr. Roll's testimony regarding the credibility of Ganadonegro's statements. The Court finds that Dr. Roll's testimony, insofar as it relates to the voluntariness of Ganadonegro's statements in an interview with the law enforcement officers, is relevant. Because the danger of unfair prejudice to the United States does not substantially outweigh the probative value of Dr. Roll's testimony relating to the voluntariness of Ganadonegro's statements, the Court will not exclude this limited testimony.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case arises out of the death of a nearly ten-month-old baby, Q.S., who died while in Ganadonegro's care on November 21, 2008. See Motion at 1; Defendant's Sealed Response to the United States' Sealed Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Dr. Samuel Roll at 2, filed March 18, 2011 (Doc. 105)("Response"). On November 22, 2009, law enforcement officers interviewed Ganadonegro. See Motion at 1; Response at 2. During the interview, Ganadonegro stated:

Transcript of Kalvest Ganadonegro Interview at 51:2-52:3, 56:4-5 (taken November 22, 2009), filed April 7, 2011 (Doc. 112-1). One of the detectives asked Ganadonegro "[a]nd she continued crying?" Tr. of Ganadonegro Interview at 56:15-16. Ganadonegro responded: "Yeah. And I tried telling her, `Don't . . . please stop crying.'. . . When I picked her back up . . . I said, `Stop crying [Q.S.]' I shook her again . . . once again, like that. And then I sat her down like this, and she fell back and hit the board." Tr. of Ganadonegro Interview at 56:17-24.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 11, 2009, a federal grand jury charged Ganadonegro with first-degree murder pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111(a) and (c)(3) and 1153. See Doc. 30. On July 10, 11, and 25, 2009, Dr. Roll conducted a psychological evaluation of Ganadonegro. See Psychological Report, filed February 15, 2011 (Doc. 101-1). Dr. Roll evaluated Ganadonegro to clarify his "mental status, especially with respect to the presence, if any, of personality features that would make him susceptible to making false admissions." Psychological Report at 1. In his Psychological Report, Dr. Roll lists several of Ganadonegro's personality features that would increase the probability of false admissions, including Ganadonegro's low verbal skills, his difficult time with language, his low estimate of his personal worth, low self-esteem, limited self-confidence, his deficit in attention and in concentration, his demonstration of impairment of reality testing capacities, and his susceptibility to episodes of depression. Dr. Roll concluded that "[t]here are a host of language factors, cultural factors, and personality factors that would have increased the probability of . . . Ganadonegro making false admissions." Psychological Report at 3. He stated: "Only an interview with the situational factors ameliorated and his personality dispositions taken into account could produce any reliable patter of admissions on his part." Psychological Report at 3.

On December 2, 2009, Ganadonegro filed a Notice of Intent to Offer Expert Testimony. See Doc. 58 ("Notice"). Ganadonegro provided notice that he intends to introduce the expert testimony of Dr. Roll during his case-in-chief at trial. Ganadonegro asserts that Dr. Roll is a licensed forensic psychologist and professor emeritus of psychology at the University of New Mexico. Ganadonegro anticipates "Roll will testify to his evaluation of . . . Ganadonegro and to . . . Ganadonegro's verbal abilities, level of intelligence, and personality structure that make him particularly susceptible to false confessions and vulnerable to suggestion." Notice at 1.

On February 15, 2011, the United States filed the United States' Sealed Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Samuel Roll. See Doc. 101. The United States moves the Court to exclude the expert testimony of Dr. Roll—a defense witness. The United States argues that Dr. Roll's testimony is irrelevant and improper under rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). The United States further argues that, even if the Court finds that Dr. Roll's testimony is admissible under rule 702, it should nevertheless exclude the testimony pursuant to rule 403, because the danger of unfair prejudice to the United States substantially outweighs any nominal probative value the testimony may have.

On March 18, 2011, Ganadonegro filed the Defendant's Sealed Response to the United States' Sealed Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Dr. Samuel Roll. See Doc. 105. Ganadonegro argues that the Court should deny the United States' motion, because Dr. Roll's expert opinion is relevant and reliable, because it is based on generally accepted psychological principles, and because it is essential to Ganadonegro's Sixth Amendment right to present a complete defense.

On April 7, 2011, the United States filed the United States' Reply in Support of its Sealed Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Samuel Roll. See Doc. 112. The United States argues that Ganadonegro is unable to provide any justification for the admission of Dr. Roll's report or testimony. It also argues that the exclusion of Dr. Roll's testimony would not violate Ganadonegro's Sixth Amendment right to present a defense.

At the hearing, Dr. Roll testified that he met Ganadonegro in July, 2009 to "do a psychological evaluation." Transcript of Hearing at 17:8-12 (taken May 13, 2011)(Pori, Roll)("Tr.").1 He testified that, "in doing th[e] psychological evaluation, [he] gave [Ganadonegro] . . . a standard battery of psychological tests that consisted of . . . the Wechsler, which is an intelligence test that breaks intelligence down into about a dozen components . . . [,] the Wide Range Achievement Test which tests the ability to read . . . [,] the [Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory ("MMPI")] and the Rorschach test." Tr. at 17:11-18 (Pori, Roll). Dr. Roll testified that all of the "tests a[re] generally accepted among forensic psychologists." Tr. at 17:19-21 (Pori, Roll). Dr. Roll also testified that all the tests are "subjected to peer review and analysis in learned journals," stating that the tests "have been published in peer re[viewed] j[ournal]s[,] have had between hundreds and thousands of peer-reviewed articles and are accepted in the field of psychology." Tr. at 17:22-18:2. Dr. Roll testified that the "tests have norms which would demonstrate whether or not a person . . . is fa[k]ing or malingering or otherwise producing an[] invalid response to the questions in the tests."2 Tr. at 18:3-9 (Pori, Roll). Dr. Roll testified that the norm, called the validity scale,3 was not applied, because Ganadonegro could not sufficiently understand the MMPI, which is the test that employs the validity scale, but stated that there are "measures on the Rorschach that indicate that the test is reliable and taken in a valid[ ] [manner] and the inconsistency measures on the Wechsler that also indicate that the test was taken in a straightforward manner." Tr. at 18:19-19:3 (Roll). Dr. Roll testified that, based on the tests, Ganadonegro has low verbal skills, because the tests showed that his overall intelligence is in the normal range—he is in the forty-second percentile—but that his verbal intelligence quotient ("I.Q.") is at the eighteenth percentile and his verbal comprehension is in the twelfth percentile. See Tr. at 19:8-12 (Roll). Dr. Roll further stated that, in the reading portion of the Wide Range Achievement Test, Ganadonegro was at the twelfth percentile. See Tr. at 20:1-3 (Roll). Dr. Roll testified that Ganadonegro's verbal skills are in the retarded area, but not his perceptual skills or his motor skills. See Tr. at 27:13-28:4 (Torrez, Roll). Dr. Roll testified that the tests measured whether Ganadonegro had a positive self-image or low self-esteem, and stated that the scores indicated that he has a low sense of self-esteem and self-confidence. See Tr. at 20:17-24 (Pori, Roll). In the digit span area—which measures one's capacity to attend and recall temporally ordered elements in the correct orde-Ganadonegro scored a ninety, which is low normal—and in verbal knowledge, he scored a sixty—which is in the retarded area. See Tr. at 30:4-16 (Torrez, Roll). Dr. Roll testified that, in his evaluation of Ganadonegro's mental status, he found mental defects—"[w]hen you have retarded attention span that's a defect[;] [w]hen you have depression that's a defect[;] [w]hen you have low self-concept that's a defe[]ct." Tr. at 57:22-58:5 (Torrez, Roll). Dr. Roll stated: "Everything I listed is a defect." Tr. at 58:19 (Roll). He stated: ("One of the defects is in the DSM-IV and that's depression because the defect that matches what's in DC. But every defect that a person can have . . . is not in the DMS-IV."). DSM-IV is the diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders.

Based on his examination of Ganadonegro and the tests he administered to Ganadonegro, Dr. Roll concluded that Ganadonegro has low verbal skills, because, although his overall intelligence is in the forty-second percentile, his verbal I.Q. is at the eighteenth percentile and his verbal comprehension is in the twelfth percentile. See Report at 1. Dr. Roll also concluded that Ganadonegro has a low estimate of his personal worth and experiences low self-esteem and limited self-confidence. See Report at 2. Dr. Roll concluded that Ganadonegro has a deficient in attention and concentration, and that his capacity to coordinate and organize data, and weigh it for contradictions and consequences, falls below most people's skill level. See Report at 2. Dr. Roll concluded that Ganadonegro demonstrated impairment of reality-testing capacities in which he tends to misperceive events, and tends to form mistaken impressions of people and what their actions signify. See Report at 2-3. Dr. Roll also concluded that Ganadonegro is susceptible to episodes of depression. See Report at 3. Based on these conclusions, Dr. Roll concluded: "There are a host of language factors, cultural factors, and personality factors that would have increased the probability of . . . Ganadonegro making false admissions. Only an interview with the situational factors ameliorated and his personality dispositions taken into account could produce any reliable pattern of admissions on his part." Report at 3.

At the hearing, the United States stated that it believed that the Court should exclude all of Dr. Roll's testimony and his report. The Court stated that it appears the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is "saying, if you . . . stick to voluntariness you can bring [the expert testimony and report] in, but you just can't get into the credibility of the prior testimony or confession." Tr. at 69:2-12 (Court).

Tr. at 69:13-16 (Court). Ganadonegro conceded at the hearing that, if the expert testimony gets into the credibility side, then the testimony is prejudicial. See Tr. at 79:8-11 (Court, Pori).

LAW REGARDING THE COURT'S ROLE UNDER DAUBERT V. MERRELL DOW PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.

Since the Supreme Court decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., trial courts have had the responsibility to make certain that proffered experts will assist the jury in understanding the evidence and in determining the factual issues it must decide. The Court now must not only decide whether the expert is qualified to testify, but, under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., whether the opinion testimony is the product of a reliable methodology.4 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. requires a court to scrutinize the proffered expert's reasoning to determine if that reasoning is sound.

1. Rule 702.

Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs the admissibility of expert testimony:

Fed.R.Evid. 702. Rule 702 thus requires the trial court to "determine whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue." United States v. Muldrow, 19 F.3d 1332, 1337 (10th Cir.1994). The Federal Rule of Evidence uses a liberal definition of "expert." Fed.R.Evid. 702 advisory committee's note ("[W]ithin the scope of this rule are not only experts in the strictest sense of the word, e.g. physicians, physicists, and architects, but also the large group sometimes called `skilled' witnesses, such as bankers or landowners testifying to land values."). An expert is "required to possess such skill, experience or knowledge in that particular field as to make it appear that his opinion would rest on substantial foundation and would tend to aid the trier of fact in his search for truth." LifeWise Master Funding v. Telebank, 374 F.3d 917, 928 (10th Cir.2004). The proponent of expert testimony has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the pertinent admissibility requirements are met. See Morales v. E.D. Etnyre & Co., 382 F.Supp.2d 1252, 1266 (D.N.M.2005)(Browning, J.)(citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987)). Once the trial court has determined that expert testimony would be helpful to the trier of fact, a witness "may qualify as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education and . . . the expert . . . should not be required to satisfy an overly narrow test of his own qualifications." Gardner v. Gen. Motors Corp., 507 F.2d 525, 528 (10th Cir.1974)(internal quotation marks omitted). The Court should, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, liberally admit expert testimony, see United States v. Gomez, 67 F.3d 1515, 1526 (10th Cir.1995)(describing rule 702 as a "liberal standard"), and the trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to admit or exclude expert testimony, see Werth v. Makita Elec. Works, Ltd., 950 F.2d 643, 647 (10th Cir.1991)(noting the trial court's decision will not be overturned "unless it is manifestly erroneous or an abuse of discretion").

2. The Standard in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

In its role of gatekeeper, a court must assess the reasoning and methodology underlying an expert's opinion, and determine whether it is both scientifically valid and relevant to the facts of the case, i.e., whether it is helpful to the trier of fact. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. at 594-95, 113 S.Ct. 2786; Witherspoon v. Navajo Ref. Co., LP, No. CIV 03-1160 BB/LAM, 2005 WL 5988649, at *2 (D.N.M. July 18, 2005)(Black, J.)(citing Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 328 F.3d 1212, 1221 (10th Cir.2003)). The Supreme Court articulated a non-exclusive list of factors that weigh into a district court's first-step reliability determination, including: (i) whether the method has been tested; (ii) whether the method has been published and subject to peer review; (iii) the error rate; (iv) the existence of standards and whether the witness applied them in the present case; and (v) whether the witness' method is generally accepted as reliable in the relevant medical and scientific community. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. at 594-95, 113 S.Ct. 2786. The court is also to consider whether the witness' conclusion represents an "unfounded extrapolation" from the data; whether the witness has adequately accounted for alternative explanations for the effect at issue; whether the opinion was reached for the purposes of litigation or as the result of independent studies; or whether it unduly relies on anecdotal evidence. See Witherspoon v. Navajo Ref. Co., LP, 2005 WL 5988649, at *3 (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997)). The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated the applicable standard in Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.:

397 F.3d at 883-84 (footnote omitted). "The second inquiry is related to the first. Under the relevance prong of the Daubert analysis, the court must ensure that the proposed expert testimony logically advances a material aspect of the case. . . . The evidence must have a valid scientific connection to the disputed facts in the case." Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d at 884 n. 2 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir.1995) (on remand from the Supreme Court), and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. at 591, 113 S.Ct. 2786). If the expert's proffered testimony fails on the first prong, the court does not reach the second prong. See Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d at 884.

In conducting its review under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the court must focus generally on "principles and methodologies, and not on the conclusions generated." Armeanu v. Bridgestone/Firestone N. Am., Tire, LLC, No. CIV 05-0619 JB/DJS, 2006 WL 4060665, at * 11 (D.N.M.)(Browning, J.)(citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. at 595, 113 S.Ct. 2786). "Despite this focus on methodology, `an expert's conclusions are not immune from scrutiny . . . and the court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered." Armeanu v. Bridgestone/Firestone N. Am., Tire, LLC, 2006 WL 4060665, at *11 (internal quotation marks and bracket omitted). The proponent of the expert's opinion testimony bears the burden of establishing that the expert is qualified, that the methodology he or she uses to support his or her opinions is reliable, and that his or her opinion fits the facts of the case and thus will be helpful to the jury. See Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d at 881. As the Tenth Circuit noted in Hollander v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp., 289 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir.2002):

289 F.3d at 1206. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted in Claar v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 29 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 1994):

29 F.3d at 502-503.

Ram v. N.M. Dep't of Env't, No. CIV 05-1083 JB/WPL, 2006 WL 4079623, at *10 (citing United States v. Rodriguez-Felix, 450 F.3d 1117, 1123 (10th Cir.2006)).

A defendant is entitled, under some circumstances, to request a written summary of expert testimony the United States intends to use in its case-in-chief. Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(1)(G). Rule 16 similarly provides that a defendant must produce a summary of expert testimony under some circumstances:

Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(b)(1)(C).

An untested hypothesis does not provide a scientific basis to support an expert opinion. See Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d at 887 ("[A]t best, silicone-associated connective tissue disease is an untested hypothesis. At worst, the link has been tested and found to be untenable. Therefore, there is no scientific basis for any expert testimony as to its specific presence in Plaintiff."); In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F.Supp.2d 1217, 1228 (D.Colo.1998)("An untested hypothesis cannot be a scientifically reliable basis for an opinion on causation."). A court is not required "to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. The court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered." Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997). See Hollander v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 289 F.3d 1193, 1209 (10th Cir.2002)(noting a lack of similarity between animal studies and human studies, including dose and route administration); Tyler v. Sterling Drug., Inc., 19 F.Supp.2d 1239, 1244 (N.D.Okla. 1998)("Test results on animals not necessarily reliable evidence of the same reaction in humans."). Courts have excluded experts' opinions when the experts depart from their own established standards. See Truck Ins. Exch. v. MagneTek, Inc., 360 F.3d at 1213 ("The district court noted that [the expert]'s opinion did not meet the standards of fire investigation [the expert] himself professed he adhered to."); Magdaleno v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 5 F.Supp.2d 899, 905 (D.Colo.1998)("In sum, [the expert]'s methodology is not consistent with the methodologies described by the authors and experts whom [the expert] identifies as key authorities in his field.").

ANALYSIS

The Court will grant in part and deny in part the United States' motion. "Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony. . . the trial judge must determine at the outset . . . whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. at 592, 113 S.Ct. 2786. The Court finds that at least some of Dr. Roll's testimony is reliable. It finds that Dr. Roll's testimony, insofar as it goes to the credibility of Ganadonegro's statements in the interview, is irrelevant. The Court will thus exclude this testimony. See United States v. Adams, 271 F.3d at 1245-46 (finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert testimony that the defendant's low neurocognitive functioning and dependent personality structure strongly raised the possibility that he was not telling the truth when he made incriminating statements to law enforcement officers). The Court finds that Dr. Roll's testimony, insofar as it relates to the voluntariness of Ganadonegro's statements in the interview, is relevant. See United States v. Benally, 541 F.3d at 995-96 (stating that it had previously recognized that United States v. Hall and United States v. Shay stood "only for the proposition that expert testimony regarding the voluntariness of a confession is admissible when the expert will testify to the existence of the defendant's identifiable medical disorder that raises a question regarding the defendant's cognitive voluntariness"). Because the danger of unfair prejudice to the United States does not substantially outweigh the probative value of Dr. Roll's testimony relating to voluntariness, the Court will not exclude this evidence. See Fed.R.Evid. 403.

I. GANADONEGRO HAS PRESENTED SUFFICIENT INFORMATION ABOUT WHAT DR. ROLL WILL TESTIFY.

The United States argues that Dr. Roll's three-page report is wholly inadequate to meet rule 702's requirements. It argues that, other than a passing mention in the first paragraph of the report of certain tests he performed in his evaluation of Ganadonegro, Dr. Roll makes no effort to explain how the five tests relate to his ultimate conclusion regarding Ganadonegro's allegedly false admissions.

Ganadonegro asserts that Dr. Roll evaluated him over a period of three days, that Dr. Roll formed his opinion based on his interview with Ganadonegro, and on the results of a battery of psychological tests that included the Rorschach, MMPI-2, Thematic Appreciation Test, WAIS III, Wide Range Achievement Test, and Human Figure Drawings. Ganadonegro argues that the United States does not dispute that each of the psychological testing instruments which Dr. Roll employed have been tested, subjected to peer review, contain rates of error for malingering, have standards which control their operation, and have been generally accepted in the scientific community. Ganadonegro also asserts that the United States never disputes that Dr. Roll is qualified to administer and interpret the results of the tests. Ganadonegro thus contends that nothing in the United States' motion suggests that the standards Dr. Roll employed in reaching his conclusions are unreliable.

In its role of gatekeeper, a court must assess the reasoning and methodology underlying an expert's opinion, and determine whether it is both scientifically valid and relevant to the facts of the case, i.e., whether it is helpful to the trier of fact. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. at 594-95, 113 S.Ct. 2786. The Supreme Court articulated a non-exclusive list of factors that weigh into a district court's first-step reliability determination, including: (i) whether the method has been tested; (ii) whether the method has been published and subject to peer review; (iii) the error rate; (iv) the existence of standards and whether the witness applied them in the present case; and (v) whether the witness' method is generally accepted as reliable in the relevant medical and scientific community. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. at 594-95, 113 S.Ct. 2786. The court is also to consider whether the witness' conclusion represents an "unfounded extrapolation" from the data; whether the witness has adequately accounted for alternative explanations for the effect at issue; whether the opinion was reached for the purposes of litigation or as the result of independent studies; and whether it unduly relies on anecdotal evidence. See Witherspoon v. Navajo Ref. Co., LP, 2005 WL 5988649, at *3 (citation omitted). In conducting its review under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the court must focus generally on "principles and methodologies, and not on the conclusions generated." Armeanu v. Bridgestone/Firestone N. Am., Tire, LLC, 2006 WL 4060665, at *11 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. at 595, 113 S.Ct. 2786). "Despite this focus on methodology, `an expert's conclusions are not immune from scrutiny ... and the court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered." Armeanu v. Bridgestone/Firestone N. Am., Tire, LLC, 2006 WL 4060665, at *11 (internal quotation marks and bracket omitted). The proponent of the expert's opinion testimony bears the burden of establishing that the expert is qualified, that the methodology he or she uses to support his or her opinions is reliable, and that his or her opinion fits the facts of the case and thus will be helpful to the jury. See Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d at 881.

Dr. Roll is a forensic psychologist and a professor emeritus at the University of New Mexico. See Curriculum Vitae for Dr. Samuel Roll at 1, Defendant's Exhibit A ("Dr. Roll's Curriculum Vitae"). Dr. Roll has a bachelor of arts in psychology, a master of science in psychology, and a doctorate in psychology. See Dr. Roll's Curriculum Vitae at 1. Dr. Roll has published numerous articles. See Dr. Roll's Curriculum Vitae at 3-12. At the hearing, Dr. Roll testified that he met Ganadonegro in July, 2009 to "do a psychological evaluation." Tr. at 17:8-12 (Pori, Roll). He testified that, "in doing th[e] psychological evaluation, [he] gave [Ganadonegro] ... a standard battery of psychological tests that consisted of ... the Wechsler, which is an intelligence test that breaks intelligence down into about a dozen components... [,] the Wide Range Achievement Test which tests the ability to read ... [,] the MMPI and the Rorschach test." Tr. at 17:11-18 (Pori, Roll). Dr. Roll testified that all of the "tests a[re] generally accepted among forensic psychologists." Tr. at 17:19-21 (Pori, Roll). Dr. Roll also testified that all the tests are "subjected to peer review and analysis in learned journals," stating that the tests "have been published in peer re[viewed] j[ournal]s[,] have had between hundreds and thousands of peer-reviewed articles and are accepted in the field of psychology." Tr. at 17:22-18:2. Dr. Roll testified that the "tests have norms which would demonstrate whether or not a person ... is fa[k]ing or malingering or otherwise producing an[ ] invalid response to the questions in the tests." Tr. at 18:3-9 (Pori, Roll). Dr. Roll testified that there are "measures on the Rorschach that indicate that the test is reliable and taken in a valid[ ] [manner] and the inconsistency measures on the Wechsler that also indicate that the test was taken in a straightforward manner." Tr. at 18:19-19:3 (Roll). Dr. Roll testified that, based on the tests, Ganadonegro has low verbal skills; the tests showed that his overall intelligence is in the normal range—he is in the forty-second percentile—but that his verbal I.Q. is at the eighteenth percentile and his verbal comprehension is in the twelfth percentile. See Tr. at 19:8-12 (Roll). Dr. Roll further stated that, in the reading portion of the Wide Range Achievement Test, Ganadonegro was at the twelfth percentile. See Tr. at 20:1-3 (Roll). Dr. Roll testified that Ganadonegro's verbal skills are in the retarded area, but not his perceptual skills or his motor skills. See Tr. at 27:13-28:4 (Torrez, Roll). Dr. Roll testified that the tests measured whether Ganadonegro had a positive self-image or low self-esteem, and stated that the scores indicated that he has a low sense of self-esteem and self-confidence. See Tr. at 20:17-24 (Pori, Roll). In the digit span area, Ganadonegro scored a ninety, which is low normal, and that, in verbal knowledge, he scored a sixty-which is in the retarded area. See Tr. at 30:4-16 (Torrez, Roll).

The Court finds that Dr. Roll's testimony is reliable. Dr. Roll has testified that the tests he used have been subjected to peer review and publication, and that the tests are generally accepted among forensic psychologists. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. at 594-95, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (listing non-exclusive factors that weigh into a reliability determination, including whether the method has been published and subject to peer review, and whether the witness' method is generally accepted as reliable in the relevant medical and scientific community); United States v. Lopez-Hodgson, 333 Fed.Appx. 347, 354 (10th Cir.2009)(finding that the district judge did not abuse its discretion in finding that Dr. Frederick's testimony was reliable, and stating that "Dr. Frederick testified that the manner in which he evaluated Mr. Lopez-Hodgson—the tests he chose to administer and observation—was the standard way to evaluate a patient in a psychiatric hospital" (citations omitted)). Dr. Roll also testified that the tests he used had norms which demonstrated whether a person was malingering or producing invalid responses. Cf. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. at 594-95, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (listing non-exclusive factors that weigh into a reliability determination, including the method's error rate). Dr. Roll also testified regarding how he came to his conclusions based on the tests he gave; for example, he found that Ganadonegro has low verbal skills, because his verbal comprehension is at the twelfth percentile. See Sallahdin v. Gibson, 275 F.3d 1211, 1238 (10th Cir.2002)(concluding that the testimony was admissible, and stating that it was "persuaded that Dr. Pope's conclusions regarding the effects of anabolic steroids were based upon scientific knowledge ... and thus were sufficiently reliable"). Dr. Roll is a qualified and respected psychologist in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and has published extensively. Dr. Roll employed standard tests that psychologists routinely use; the tests appear to be used by Dr. Roll's peers, accepted by other psychologists in the field, and accepted in the psychological journals. There is no suggestion that he administered them incorrectly. There is also no evidence that the test results are not reliable. Thus, Dr. Roll's testimony appears sound and has solid foundation in accepted psychology methodology. The Court thus finds that Dr. Roll's testimony about the tests and the results of the tests is reliable. See United States v. Rodriguez-Felix, 450 F.3d 1117, 1125-26 (10th Cir.2006)(finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Clark's testimony, because the report was insufficient to allow the district court to "assess the reasoning and methodology underlying the expert's opinion," and stating that the description of Dr. Clark's research was inadequate, because "it fails to indicate whether it has been subjected to peer review, whether it has been published, and whether it has been accepted by other psychologists in the field," and because, "other than generalized assertions regarding the factors which can affect an eyewitness's identification," Dr. Clark's report "fails to sufficiently reference specific and recognized scientific research, which underlies Dr. Clark's conclusions, such that the court could determine if this foundational research had been subjected to peer review, and, if so, whether it had been accepted in the community").

II. DR. ROLL'S TESTIMONY, INSOFAR AS IT GOES TO THE CREDIBILITY OF GANADONEGRO'S STATEMENTS, IS IRRELEVANT.

The United States also argues that, as a matter of law, Dr. Roll's proposed testimony is irrelevant, and infringes on the jury's province to determine the facts and to assess credibility. The United States argues that Ganadonegro seeks to have Dr. Roll testify as to his verbal abilities, level of intelligence, and personality structure that make him particularly susceptible to false confessions and vulnerable to suggestion. It argues that Dr. Roll contends that Ganadonegro's language, cultural, and personality factors increase the probability of him making false admissions, and that this is the same testimony that United States v. Adams and United States v. Benally prohibit. It argues that Dr. Roll fails to diagnose Ganadonegro with any identifiable medical disorder which raises any question regarding the cognitive voluntariness of his statements to law enforcement officers, and that, instead, he describes alleged personality features and concludes that such features simply increase the probability of a false confession. The United States argues that, as such, Dr. Roll's testimony would fall squarely within the holdings of United States v. Adams and United States v. Benally. It argues that this testimony encroaches on the jury's vital and exclusive function to make credibility determinations, and thus will not assist the trier of fact as rule 702 requires. The United States thus asks the Court to exclude Dr. Roll's testimony.

Ganadonegro contends that Dr. Roll's testimony is relevant and admissible, because the phenomenon of false confession is not well known to the general public and few people understand the circumstances which could lead someone to falsely testify to a crime he or she did not commit. Ganadonegro argues that Dr. Roll's proffered testimony is admissible, because evidence concerning the physical and psychological environment that yielded the confession can be of substantial relevance to the ultimate factual issue of a defendant's guilt or innocence. He argues that, as long as the expert witness evaluates the defendant and describes the psychological circumstances which could give rise to his suggestibility, without opining that the defendant was not telling the truth when he made incriminating statements, the proffered testimony is admissible.

Rule 702 requires the trial court to "determine whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue." United States v. Muldrow, 19 F.3d at 1337. In its role of gatekeeper, a court must assess the reasoning and methodology underlying an expert's opinion, and determine whether it is both scientifically valid and relevant to the facts of the case, i.e., whether it is helpful to the trier of fact. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. at 594-95, 113 S.Ct. 2786. "The second inquiry is related to the first. Under the relevance prong of the Daubert analysis, the court must ensure that the proposed expert testimony logically advances a material aspect of the case.... The evidence must have a valid scientific connection to the disputed facts in the case." Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d at 884 n. 2 (citation omitted).

Several circuit courts have addressed the exclusion of expert testimony regarding the reliability of the defendant's admissions or the defendant's susceptibility to false admissions, see United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126; United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337, and the Tenth Circuit discusses these cases in its opinions addressing the issue, see United States v. Adams, 271 F.3d at 1245 ("Only two circuit courts have dealt with the question of the admissibility of expert testimony concerning credibility, and both, under the facts of those cases and the manner of presentation, concluded that the respective trial court committed error in excluding such testimony." (citing United States v. Shay and United States v. Hall)). In United States v. Shay, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit addressed whether the district court "properly prevented the defendant from supporting his argument [that the incriminating statements he made were unreliable and should be disregarded] by calling a psychiatrist to testify that he suffered from a mental disorder that causes its victims to make false and grandiose statements without regard to the consequences." 57 F.3d at 128. The defendant offered an expert who was prepared to testify that he suffered from a mental disorder that "caused him to make grandiose statements similar in nature to the statements that the government was seeking to use against him." 57 F.3d at 133.

57 F.3d at 133-34.

In United States v. Hall, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that the district court erred in excluding testimony the defendant proffered, which "would have put before the jury his claim that his `confession' to the crime was actually false." 93 F.3d at 1339.

93 F.3d at 1339-40. On appeal, Hall argued that the district court erred in refusing to permit his experts to testify about false confessions and his susceptibility to coercion. See 93 F.3d at 1340.

93 F.3d at 1341. The district court found no potential usefulness in the evidence, "because it was within the jury's knowledge." 93 F.3d at 1345.

93 F.3d at 1345-46.

In United States v. Adams, the defendant argued that the district court's "exclusion of expert testimony by a clinical psychologist denied his right to due process and a fair trial." 271 F.3d at 1240. The police had responded to a residential disturbance, and, upon arriving at the scene, an officer looked into a vehicle the defendant and another individual occupied, and saw a black case, which he determined contained an assault-style semi-automatic pistol. See id. at 1240. Upon questioning, the defendant told the officer that the vehicle and weapon belonged to him, and that he had purchased the weapon a few days earlier. See 271 F.3d at 1240. Defense counsel arranged a psychological examination for the defendant, and the defense anticipated introducing the resulting psychological report. See 271 F.3d at 1240. The United States moved to exclude the report, arguing that the substance was inadmissible and that the defense notified it about the report past the deadline set out in the discovery order. See 271 F.3d at 1240. The district court granted the Untied States' motion. See 271 F.3d at 1240. The defendant "tried again at the onset of trial to admit the psychologist's report, claiming that it was relevant to Mr. Adams's mental condition and education, factors that could be considered in judging the credibility of his incriminating statements." 271 F.3d at 1240. "Again, the [United States] objected to the substance and timing of the evidence and again the court excluded it." 271 F.3d at 1240. At trial, the United States relied heavily on the incriminating statements the defendant made to the officers. See 271 F.3d at 1240. The jury returned a guilty verdict. See 271 F.3d at 1241. The Tenth Circuit reviewed the exclusion of the report for an abuse of discretion. See 271 F.3d at 1243. The defendant "sought to introduce the psychological evidence in order to diminish the credibility of his earlier statements to the police." 271 F.3d at 1244. On appeal, he argued that the testimony showed that he had neurocognitive impairment and a dependent personality structure, and that this evidence supported the possibility that the statements he gave to the police were false. See 271 F.3d at 1244. The Tenth Circuit stated:

271 F.3d at 1244-45. The Tenth Circuit noted that the "Supreme Court has held that Rule 702 imposes a special obligation upon a trial judge to ensure that all expert testimony, even non-scientific and experience-based expert testimony, is both relevant and reliable." 271 F.3d at 1245 (citations omitted). The Tenth Circuit stated:

271 F.3d at 1245-46 (emphasis in original).

In United States v. Benally, the defendant argued that the district court abused its discretion by excluding testimony of an "expert witness on false confessions who would have provided support for his claim that his confession to FBI agents was untrue." 541 F.3d at 992. Two girls indicated that they had been sexually abused by the defendant. See 541 F.3d at 992. Following these allegations, FBI officers interviewed the defendant. See 541 F.3d at 992. The defendant "initially denied touching either girl inappropriately, but confessed to the allegations later in the interview. At the conclusion of the meeting, he provided the agents with a written confession." 541 F.3d at 992. At trial, the defendant disavowed his confession "and claimed it was prompted by coercive tactics used by the FBI agents. He testified that the agents repeatedly insisted he was lying when he denied the charges and `would not take no for an answer.'" 541 F.3d at 993.

541 F.3d at 993. Before trial, the defendant notified the United States that he planned to call "Dr. Deborah Davis, a professor of psychology at the University of Nevada at Reno, as an expert witness on false confessions." 541 F.3d at 993. The defendant "offered Dr. Davis's testimony on two subjects: (1) whether false confessions occur; and (2) why people confess falsely. Dr. Davis had never examined [the defendant], and would not offer an opinion as to whether he confessed falsely." 541 F.3d at 993. At a hearing pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the district court ruled that Dr. Davis' testimony was inadmissible, because "it did not meet the standards for relevant or reliability required by Daubert." 541 F.3d at 993. On appeal, the defendant argued that the district court erred by excluding Dr. Davis' testimony on false confessions. See 541 F.3d at 993.

541 F.3d at 993-94. The Tenth Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Dr. Davis' testimony. See 541 F.3d at 994. It stated that United States v. Adams supported its conclusion. See 541 F.3d at 994. The defendant sought to distinguish his case from United States v. Adams "based on the fact that unlike the expert in Adams, Dr. Davis did not intend to provide an opinion as to whether the defendant before the court falsely confessed." 541 F.3d at 995. The Tenth Circuit stated:

541 F.3d at 995-96.

On a clean slate, the Court might be inclined to draw the same line that the Seventh Circuit drew in United States v. Hall and that the First Circuit drew in United States v. Shay. In other words, the Court agrees that the defendant should be able to proffer a psychological expert to explain to the jury that some defendants give, for whatever reason, false confessions to a crime, and that the defendant has psychological traits that make it possible that he would give a false confession. The Court would not, as apparently any court would not, allow the expert to say a particular defendant gave a false confession. The Court believes that this line prevents the expert from invading the province of the jury, provides relevant and useful information to a lay jury, and does not allow the expert to offer testimony on the credibility of the defendant. It simply gives the jury the tools to make an informed decision about false confessions, which appear to actually occur. The public may not be aware of false confessions as much as those individuals in the criminal justice system, and the expert could provide valuable insight necessary to assure the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. The Court believes, particularly with careful limiting instructions, that a jury could distinguish between information about the psychology profession's beliefs about false confessions, and the limits on the expert's opinion as to what a particular defendant did. Jurors are pretty smart, and the Court's experience is that they routinely ignore experts and make their own credibility decisions. The Court is not, however, writing on a clean slate. The Tenth Circuit has, in two published opinions, excluded testimony that the First Circuit and Seventh Circuit probably would have allowed. The Court might manufacture some distinction between the circumstances in this case, and those in United States v. Adams and United States v. Benally, such as that the defendant in the Tenth Circuit cases did not challenge the voluntariness of the statement or the defendant did not have an identifiable medical disorder. In the end, however, the Court does not believe any distinction to the Tenth Circuit's decisions would be sound and in good faith. And in the end, our system depends upon district courts faithfully adhering to the circuit's law. See United States v. Escobedo-Guillermo, 2009 WL 1231987, at *1 (D.N.M. April 27, 2009) ("[T]he Court, as a district court, must be careful to follow binding Tenth Circuit authority ....").

The Court will thus exclude Dr. Roll's testimony insofar as it relates to the credibility of Ganadonegro's statements in the interview. Although the Tenth Circuit has instructed that a district court cannot "categorically exclude all expert testimony" regarding the credibility of incriminating statements, the Tenth Circuit has noted that "the credibility of witnesses is generally not an appropriate subject for expert testimony." United States v. Adams, 271 F.3d at 1244-45. As in United States v. Adams, where the Tenth Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert's testimony that the defendant's low neurocognitive functioning and dependent personality structure strongly raised the possibility that he was not telling the truth when he made incriminating statements to the police officers, because the testimony did little more than vouch for the credibility of another witness and thus encroached on the jury's exclusive function to make credibility determinations, the Tenth Circuit's opinion strongly suggests that Dr. Roll's testimony that there are a host of language factors, cultural factors, and personality factors that would have increased the probability of Ganadonegro making false admissions does little more than vouch for the credibility of Ganadonegro's statement, and thus encroaches on the jury's exclusive function to make credibility determinations. The Court thus finds, under United States v. Adams and United States v. Benally that the "evidence lack[s] relevance and would not assist the trier of fact as required by Rule 702." United States v. Adams, 271 F.3d at 1246 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See United States v. Benally, 541 F.3d at 995-96 (stating that Dr. Davis' testimony would encroach on the jury's vital and exclusive function to make credibility determinations, because, while the defendant argued that "Dr. Davis would not have opined as to whether she believed Mr. Benally confessed falsely, with or without the opinion, the import of her expert testimony would be the same: disregard the confession and credit the defendant's testimony that his confession was a lie"). The Court will thus exclude this evidence.

III. THE COURT WILL NOT EXCLUDE SOME OF DR. ROLL'S TESTIMONY TO THE EXTENT IT IS OFFERED ON THE ISSUE OF VOLUNTARINESS.

The Court will not exclude some of Dr. Roll's testimony insofar as it relates to the voluntariness of Ganadonegro's statements in the interview. Ganadonegro argues that, at trial, the United States will offer Ganadonegro's statements and that, in assessing the voluntariness of the confession, the triers of fact will consider the totality of the circumstances. See Tr. at 9:2-9 (Pori). Unlike United States v. Adams, where there was "no question about the voluntariness of the confessions," 271 F.3d at 1246, there is a question whether Ganadonegro's statements were voluntary. As in United States v. Hall, where the defendant contended that a personality disorder caused him to confess during interrogation and sign a statement to gain the approval of his interrogators, Ganadonegro contends that his low verbal skills and other personality factors made him vulnerable to suggestion in an interview and thus susceptible to falsely confessing. "[I]t [i]s certainly within the jury's province to assess the truthfulness and accuracy of the confession." United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d at 1344. The Tenth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions state:

Tenth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions Criminal § 1.25, at 40 (2011 Edition).5 Although this pattern jury instruction directs jurors to consider factors bearing on the voluntariness of the statement to determine whether the statement is reliable and credible, the precedent in the Tenth Circuit appears to draw a line between expert testimony regarding credibility and expert testimony regarding voluntariness. See United States v. Benally, 541 F.3d at 996 (distinguishing United States v. Hall and United States v. Shay from the case before it, where it excluded expert testimony regarding credibility of statements, because the defendant in the case before it did not involve expert testimony regarding the voluntariness of a confession). The Tenth Circuit may draw this distinction because, generally, it is the jury's exclusive function to make credibility determinations, see United States v. Adams, 271 F.3d at 1245, whereas a court makes a pretrial determination of the constitutional voluntariness of a statement and, if the court finds that the statement was voluntary, the defendant may challenge the statement's reliability at trial, see Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 688-89, 106 S.Ct. 2142 ("[D]ue process ... requires `that a jury [not] hear a confession unless and until the trial judge [or some other independent decisionmaker] has determined that it was freely and voluntarily given.'").6 The jury does not decide the constitutional voluntariness; they decide only factual voluntariness to assess the statement's reliability and credibility. The Tenth Circuit's distinction between testimony regarding credibility and testimony regarding voluntariness is thus consistent with the pattern jury instructions. An expert may testify about mental or physical conditions which may bear on the voluntariness of the statement, because the area of voluntariness is not in the exclusive province of the jury; a court makes a pretrial determination of the voluntariness of a statement and the jury considers the statement only if the court finds that the statement was voluntary under the Constitution. When the jury plays its role in the voluntariness analysis, an expert may have specialized knowledge regarding suggestibility of which the jurors are not aware; however, an expert may not opine on the credibility of a confession, as that is in the exclusive province of the jury.7

The United States argues that Dr. Roll did not "find any mental disease or defect," Tr. at 57:22-24 (Torrez), but Dr. Roll testified that he found mental defects, such as retarded attention span, depression, and low self-concept, and that everything he listed is a defect, even though every defect he listed is not in the DSM-IV, see Tr. at 58:2-19 (Torrez, Roll). Based on standard psychological tests, Dr. Roll identified mental defects such as low verbal skills, deficit in attention and concentration, impairment-of-reality testing capacities, depression, and personality features such as a low estimate of personal worth—which may, without ameliorating situational factors, have led left Ganadonegro vulnerable to suggestion. See Report at 1-3; Notice at 1. Unlike United States v. Benally, where the Tenth Circuit distinguished United States v. Hall and United States v. Shay, because the defendant did not identify a medical condition that contributed to his decision to confess, Dr. Roll has identified several mental defects that may have contributed to Ganadonegro's decision to confess. The Court thus finds that, insofar as Dr. Roll's testimony relates to "the existence of ... identifiable medical disorder[s]" or defects which "raise[ ] a question regarding [Ganadonegro's] cognitive voluntariness," the testimony is admissible. United States v. Benally, 541 F.3d at 995-96.

How this distinction between expert testimony offered regarding credibility and regarding voluntariness plays out in this case is that Dr. Roll will not be able to talk generally about the phenomenon of false confessions and that Ganadonegro fits the profile of someone who would give a false confession. Dr. Roll cannot suggest in his testimony that the confession is wrong, a lie, false, not credible, or unreliable. He may, however, give the results of his tests, the existence of identifiable medical disorders in the form of mental defects, and what these mean. He then will have to stop there. The rest will have to be left to Ganadonegro to argue in closing that the statement was not voluntary.

IV. THE COURT WILL NOT EXCLUDE DR. ROLL'S TESTIMONY RELATING TO THE VOLUNTARINESS OF GANADONEGRO'S STATEMENTS UNDER RULE 403.

The United States argues that, even if the Court were to conclude that Dr. Roll's testimony clears the rule 702 hurdle, the Court should nevertheless exclude the testimony on the grounds that the unfair prejudice the United States would suffer as a result of its admission substantially outweighs any probative value that Ganadonegro may gain by its introduction. Ganadonegro argues that the United States will suffer no prejudice from the admission of Dr. Roll's opinion, because he is not vouching for Ganadonegro's credibility or telling the jury whether any of Ganadonegro's statements to the FBI agents are false. Ganadonegro asserts that, on the contrary, Dr. Roll is prepared only to offer the jury some factors to consider when they are deciding whether Ganadonegro's statements are voluntary. Ganadonegro argues that the exclusion of Dr. Roll's testimony will deprive him of his fundamental constitutional right to present a complete defense to the criminal charges against him.

Rule 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Fed.R.Evid. 403. Unlike United States v. Benally, where the Tenth Circuit found that whatever relevance Dr. Davis' testimony had was minimal, because Dr. Davis did not examine the defendant, and was not going to specifically discuss him or the circumstances surrounding his confession in her testimony, Dr. Roll has evaluated and examined Ganadonegro, and will testify to his evaluation of Ganadonegro and to Ganadonegro's verbal abilities, level of intelligence and personality structure. The Tenth Circuit's pattern jury instruction regarding the voluntariness of a defendant's statement states that, in determining whether any such statement is reliable and credible, the jury should consider factors bearing on the voluntariness of the statement, such as the defendant's age, gender, training, education, physical and mental condition, and any evidence concerning his treatment while under interrogation. See Jury Instruction 1.25, at 40. Because Dr. Roll will offer testimony regarding factors for the jury to consider in deciding whether Ganadonegro's confession was voluntary, this evidence has more than minimal relevance.

Although the evidence will be prejudicial to the United States, the Court cannot say that the prejudice to the United States will substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence. Evidence that one party presents in support of its position invariably prejudices the opposing party. Dr. Roll will not opine that Ganadonegro's statements should be disregarded as untrue. See United States v. Benally, 541 F.3d at 995 ("Even if we were to assume the limited relevance of this general testimony, we conclude that a district court could reasonably conclude that the prejudice to the prosecution that would result from permitting an expert to opine that prior confessions should essentially be disregarded because they are just as likely to be true as untrue, substantially outweighs the testimony's minimal probative value."). Rather Dr. Roll will be limited to explaining to the jury who Ganadonegro is as a person; it will be Ganadonegro's attorney who may argue that the statement was not given voluntarily. The Court will allow Dr. Roll to present testimony regarding the identifiable medical disorders in the form of mental defects which may raise questions regarding Ganadonegro's voluntariness, but the determination of voluntariness will be left to the jury. If the United States seeks a limiting instruction, the Court will include one, which will help allay any undue influence on the jury. See United States v. Adams, 271 F.3d at 1243 ("Yet another rationale for exclusion is that the testimony of impressively qualified experts on the credibility of other witnesses is prejudicial, unduly influences the jury, and should be excluded under Rule 403."). It appears that, at trial, the United States will introduce Ganadonegro's statements. "[T]he Constitution guarantees criminal defendants `a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense,'" Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 690, 106 S.Ct. 2142 (citation omitted), and if the United States introduces Ganadonegro's statements, Ganadonegro should be able to present evidence regarding the "physical and psychological environment that yielded the confession," United States v. Adams, 271 F.3d at 1244 (citation omitted). The jury will then decide the ultimate factual issue of Ganadonegro's guilt or innocence. The Court thus finds that the probative value of Dr. Roll's testimony, insofar as it relates to voluntariness, is not substantially outweighed by danger of undue prejudice to the United States.

IT IS ORDERED that the United States' Sealed Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Samuel Roll, filed February 15, 2011 (Doc. 101), is granted in part and denied in part. The Court will exclude Dr. Samuel Roll's testimony insofar as it goes to the credibility of Defendant Kalvest Ganadonegro's statements. Dr. Roll will not be allowed to testify generally about the phenomenon of false confessions or that Ganadonegro fits the profile of someone who would give a false statement. The Court will not exclude Dr. Roll's testimony, insofar as it relates to the voluntariness of Ganadonegro's statements. Dr. Roll may testify as to the tests he concluded on Ganadonegro, the results of these tests, and any identifiable medical disorders or defects that Ganadonegro has.